Abstract: This comment on Kocyba's article discusses both his economic and moral assumptions, arguing that the shift from industrial capitalism towards a`new spirit' of more autonomous forms of work is not captured by Kocyba's comparison between producing things alone and creating services together. Consequently, the main problem is not, as Kocyba believes, the determination of an individual's share in the (intangible) product, but the competitive mindset of this new spirit, which has many undesired consequences. Concerning the`moral presuppositions' it is argued that the questionable self-restriction to`immanent norms' induces a strong armative tendency which is at odds with Kocyba's critical aspirations. The idea that critical theory can only refer to norms which are already institutionalized needs to be dropped in order to revive the critical dimension. It is argued that Kocyba is already half way there and needs to make this break more explicit.
Introduction
Hermann Kocyba's article on the role of recognition in contemporary capitalism touches many topics all in one go. His main interest is to re-interpret recognition in the eld of work as something that is not only immanent in social practices in Axel Honneth's additive understanding (as a normative frame, concerned with the`public justiability' of a certain organization). For Kocyba, recognition is built into the very logic of the new, service-based capitalism itselfnot only as a frame, but as a core ( recognition is [. . . ] co-constitutive of economic action, he says twice). In the post-Taylorist economy and its new forms of work, recognition presumably has itself assumed economic functions, for example the determination of the economic value of products and wages. Consequently a service only has economic value if it is recognized by the customer. The only problem that remains seems to be the diculty of determining the economic value' of a single contribution to such a service. This determination, Kocyba says, is not as easy as in the case of material goods production, but it is important in order to`distribute' the right amounts of money and recognition to every single contribution. Therefore the question`how can the value of service activities be made visible?' seems to bother Kocyba the most. In the following I will react to this approach in two ways: rst I will outline a general political criticism (2), and then I will suggest a theoretical alternative concerning the development of norms (3).
The Moral History of Work
Kocyba wants to combine empirical research and normative reasoninga claim which I basically share.
1 However, I have some subsequent thoughts about the way it is done, and these concern the empirical as well as the normative element and also social theory, which is sandwiched between data and norms. Let me start with the norms. For a moral philosopher it is a good starting point to assume that normative claims are the base (`presupposition') of social processes.
It allows him to describe society in a normativist way and attaches a certain relevance to his theory. As a theory of society, however, this is untenable. We do not have norms rst and then build our practices in their image. Practices come rst (both logically and temporally), and they are and remain conictridden. Norms result from these practices, trying to regulate their`wild', everchanging and often anarchic nature. This also holds for norms in the world of labor. Theysay: equal respect for womenare results of social conicts, rather than their`presupposition'. Therefore their content certainly is not a good representation of real life in societyit would be a`normativist fallacy' to read a theory of society from the norms of the said society. ones. This, however, is a dangerous move: incomes have become more and more unequal in recent decades. Why should it be deserved in every case, andmore importantlyhow do we know? The price for this new regime of individualized recognition is an increased inequality, both in terms of money and moral standing. I can hardly see why this regime should be particularly`moral'. Narratives of merit or talent do not explain these inequalities, even if they try to justify (i.e. ideologize) them. A sound economic theory is required in order to make valid judgments, and I simply do not see it here.
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That brings me to the empirical side. In his description of the shift from the old to the new capitalism, Kocyba describes two kinds of work: one is an atomistic production of things (resembling pre-industrial craftsmanship), the other is a social activity with immaterial results (service). His problem is that à recognition' of the work done is easy in the rst case and dicult in the second. First we have manual production labor. This, however, is not`producing things'. Work is fragmented on the assembly line, and it's hard to distinguish each person's share. The question of the impact of a particular individual on the value produced has always existed for industrial capitalism. But there was also an easy solution: a workers' wage is not usually based on things, it does not even reect the value of the products, since most of it goes into prots, not wages (the share of labor in productivity growth has declined steadily). Workers are paid for the amount of labor time they contribute. The hours and average wage rate for a fulltime job reect what is`normal' for a society to have in order to reproduce one's labor power. This is the`moral element' that even Karl Marx referred to. It reects the bargaining power of dierent classes at a particular moment in time. Today, with declining unions and powerful stock markets, it is considered normal that even 40 hours of work do not earn a livingnot a very`moral' custom. (`Moral presuppositions', if they were ever present in the organization of work, seem to have gone amiss.) Yet even within industrial production, other kinds of work are involved: repairing a machine, for instance, is not the same as producing thingsit is maintenance. Neither is making plans and overseeing workers (management work), distributing products (trade and transportation work) or advertising (marketing work). These activities have been with us for centuries. Now, where does economic value enter the scene? The answer is easy: industrial production (including the banking sector) produces commodities, and commodities have a value. It is important to see that commodities do not have to be things. Anything sold on the market is a commodity: a haircut, a trip to the beach, a song, even love or nancial derivatives. So instead of applying a metaphysics of things, we should start with the division of labor in the collective production of commodities. It can be anything, so it is not crucial whether we are engaged on the 4 None of these types of work is paid or recognized for`things' produced. So the link from work to recognition leads neither through money nor through things.
In which way are these activities connected to recognition then, and what in particular is recognized here? I would put it the following way: in western societies, somebody who`goes to work' and earns a decent living is recognized as a normal member of society. This is a good thing only insofar as it is bad not to have it. Not recognized, therefore, are people who do not work (e.g. the unemployed, even if involuntary) or who work indecently (as thieves or prostitutes).
5 However, being recognized as normal is not very exciting, nor is it in any substantial way moral. It is not exciting because everybody is recognizedthere is a fragile sense of equality here. It is not moral because the monetary link (we said we recognize somebody for his earnings) is accompanied by an inequality of recognition. Why should a social theory rearm this? If the amount of recognition a job brings reects its alleged contribution to the value of the product, which in turn is said to be reected in the wage, we chain a moral element to a highly contingent market outcome. That is problematic, for market outcomes are never`just'. A dumb actor, a stupid singer or a ruthless manager might earn a fortune, and in consequence become highly recognized members of society. A nurse or a guard, by contrast, may work very hard, but earn very little, and in consequence be recognized to a lesser degree. Why should that be considered moral? Instead of throwing morality and markets together, I think it is necessary to distinguish them. Otherwise we end up condemning people morally for their weak market positiona regrettable Victorian attitude. There is no direct link between money and morals, neither via value talk nor via recognition. Both terms are much too ambivalent.
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Now what about the historical shift? For this I would like to focus on yet another type of work. There are also non-market types of work. Typically these are social services; but the dierence is not due to the type of activity, but to the social location.
7 If the employer is public, it is non-market. So, by denition, social services do not produce commodities. As long as there is no market, anyone trying to buy these products is considered`corrupt'it would pave the way for an unequal society. Once there is a market, however, you may buy and sell. Until recently schools, hospitals and even some banks were social services; hence market value was not a measure of recognition. Rather it was the other way round: the wage a school inspector, a policemen or a judge earned reected the moral respect that society paid to these activities. Years of membership 4 The kind of`merit' applied to prots is rarely questioned; with public guarantees, it is no longer the risk taken.
5 In most cases banking is still considered to be decentone may wonder why, but that is another story. 8 Rather, it is a question either of market rates (which includes brute luck) or, even worse, of access to power. The skyrocketing wages in nancial industries have little to do with moral`merit' or with adding economic`value'; they have a lot to do with control. Banks control everybody's funds, so they have power over incredible nancial resourcesand serve themselves lavishly. The amounts paid in bonuses reect a loss of moral standards, which in turn can be attributed to a loss of social control due to a massive privatization of public goods and funds. It would be impossible for members of parliament to assign themselves a million francs for hitting a random target, just because they control and invest tax money.
Something similar is true in other sectors, too: if the pay level depends on performance, but performance is hard to measure, this leads to a high level of discretion, which opens a door to`neo-feudal' forms of personal dependency.
And here the term`individualized recognition' serves as a euphemism for the precarious strategies individuals use in order to make their work appear as important as possible to superiors. I do not agree that it is the task of critical social theory to construct new performance-based pay schemes in order to make this system more`just' according to its own norms, as Kocyba seems to imply at times. Instead, social theory should highlight the negative eects of this new economic regime of esteem: it boosts social inequality and an anti-social sense of competition, both of which erode what little is left of the sense of cooperation and solidarity between co-workers (and co-citizens). If we want morality in the workplace, it cannot tacitly be abstracted into the theory of society. We need more public controlit is as simple as that. Maybe some people prefer eciency over morals. Some do, some do not; this is a political question and not for philosophers to decide. However, philosophy should not cover up things, either.
We should be careful not to make crude market dynamics look`moral' by using an over-inclusive language of recognition, respect and esteem where we really deal with contingent market dynamics, power over resources and neo-Darwinian self-staging strategies.
Reviving the Critical Dimension
Up to now, my comments have been rather sketchy and political. Before I close I would like to suggest an alternative approach. For this I will return to norms. Kocyba. It is not the`paradox of recognition' (it cannot be achieved directly, so the more that is demanded, the less is supplied), for according to Kocyba this can be resolved if we use`indirect ways'. Neither is it the waning of the old capitalism, for it would be naive to long for this`paradise lost' which did not seem to be one when we had it.
10 Neither is it the fact that the new capitalism comes with much higher inequality and competition: Kocyba does not want to rephrase old-school criticisms of`distribution',`exploitation' or`conicts of interest'. Instead, in some sections he suggests a language of inauthenticity and suering. This, however, needs further explanation, for it could still be read armatively in the following way: people should be authentic on the job; however, if they are misread by their superiors, they are forced to`deep act' (Hochschild) roles which are not really theirs (Rastetter 2008) . Viewed from within the new norms this boils down to a management problem: if we put the right people at the right place, everybody is happy. Consequently, perhaps managers should try to learn even more about every worker's personality (and 9 Concerning immanent norms Kocyba rightly asks: In which sense can they be valid and invalidated at the same time? He also questions Honneth's ideal of visibility and prefers an ideal of self-control. everything I could possibly say will be informed by my historical situation. In eect I would not have to bother proving that the norms I apply are in some way`immanent' in the society I aim to criticize. They necessarily are, whatever I say. This is a strange way to remove the inherited self-restriction: lip service is paid to the idea of`immanent norms', but its point is undermined almost completely. I would prefer to spell out clearly that the self-restriction is abandoned.
What is so bad about norms that transcend the horizon of a contemporary society? Honneth's fear, which he took from Michael Walzer and others, was that nobody would understand the critic, so he would become elitist and authoritarian (2000, 73.) . This, however, greatly underestimates the intellectual capacities of everyday people. They usually do understand what justice, freedom or equality means, even in societies lacking their proper institutionalization (see Sayer 2011) . Without the courage to transcend given norms, a critical theory will lend itself to armative normalizations of given norms. This way, the desired`moral progress' (Honneth 2010, 115, 226) will never come about. Most of the`moral progress' that we have witnessed in recent centuries had to rely on norms external to the given society. This teaches us a dierent lesson about`historical reexivity': more progressive norms are not extension of old ones. Think of equal rights for women: they are not extensions of former male rights to domination, but instead completely changed the idea of having a right for both men and women. Likewise, civil rights are not an extension of former feudal rights; rather, these old rights ended with civil rights. That does not mean that new norms are taken out of the blue:
there are many aspects which transcend a given society and have the potential to inform new norms.
11 It is only an overstretched social constructivism which
